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Abstract
The risk premium is a¤ected by loss aversion and probability distortions as well as utility cur-
vature. We introduce two variants - the total risk premium relative to objective expected value,
and the subjective risk premium relative to perceived expected value. Approximate solutions for
each provide analogies to the Pratt-Arrow coe¢ cient of risk aversion (showing how risk attitude
depends on each behavioural component), and su¢ cient conditions for risk aversion. Earlier
results of Levy and Levy (2002) which examined decision weights in isolation are revised and
extended to show how the curvature and loss aversion conditions are a¤ected by probability
distortions.
Keywords: Risk-Premium; Cumulative Prospect Theory; Loss Aversion; Decision Weights;
Utility Curvature
JEL Subject Categories: D81
2
It is a commonly held belief amongst economists that humans are, or should be risk averse.
Simply put this usually means that, given the choice between a certain amount of money and a
gamble for which the expectation is the same amount of money, a risk averse individual will choose
certainty. For most people, introspection reveals this to be quite plausible in many situations,
although risk-seeking behaviour has often been observed in experimental studies of human choice.
In standard economic models the acceptability of risk aversion has been increased by the fact
that it is a necessary conclusion if people face diminishing marginal utility, an assumption for
which the intuitive appeal is much stronger. It was seldom questioned, however, whether it is
reasonable to associate human risk attitude entirely with the propensity to appreciate each unit
of consumption by slightly less as the total amount increases. Surely an attitude to risk involves
somewhat more than diminishing marginal returns? Recent developments have introduced more
sophisticated and empirically accurate models of human choice which break this strict one-to-
one link and enable us to examine more closely the question of what underlying behavioural
factors determine risk attitude. These factors still include diminishing sensitivity to amounts of
money or consumption, but add to this the human tendency to be more concerned with losses
than with gains, as well as psychological e¤ects such as hope and fear, which draw our attention
respectively towards extremely good, and extremely bad outcomes in a gamble.
The notion of the risk premium of a gamble has provided a useful way of characterising the
degree of risk aversion of an individual facing a risky choice. It is traditionally dened as the
amount by which the expected value of the gamble exceeds the certainty equivalent value. Thus,
the risk premium is the certain amount that an individual would give up in order to avoid the risk
inherent in the gamble. A positive risk premium may be taken to be indicative of risk aversion. In
the standard framework of Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the risk premium has a particularly
simple interpretation. K. Arrow (1965) and J. Pratt (1964) showed that, approximately, the risk
premium depends only on the variance of the lottery, and on the "coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion" which reects the shape of the decision makers utility function. More fundamentally,
the risk premium is positive if and only if the utility function is concave. Thus, in continuous
form EUT risk averse or risk seeing behaviour is governed entirely by the concavity or convexity
respectively of the (increasing) utility function.
In recent decades, the simple framework of EUT has been found to provide a poor description
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of actual behaviour in risky situations and has undergone a number of revisions that attempt to
remedy this descriptive failure. Amongst these remedies (which have not yet been completely
successful in the quest for descriptive adequacy (see Davies 2004)) have been the introduction of
utility seen in terms of changes from a reference point rather than in terms of absolute wealth
levels (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and the related notion of Loss Aversion. These changes
have reected greater psychological sophistication in the way in which utilities are deemed to be
attached to monetary outcomes. A further signicant shift was the recognition that individuals
may distort objective or subjective probabilities when making decisions due to their attention be-
ing disproportionately directed to the outcomes in the tails of the distribution of outcomes. This
resulted in the suite of Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) models of which the rst was described
by Quiggin (1982).
These new elements introduced into EUT have the result that risk aversion can no longer
be simply described in terms of the curvature of the utility function. Both loss aversion and
non-linear probability distortions add new sources of risk attitude to that traditionally derived
from the concavity of the utility function. In addition, the utility function itself may display
quite di¤erent characteristics for losses than for gains. Thus, whilst the sign of the risk premium
may still be taken to reect the overall risk attitude (either risk aversion or risk seeking), this
sign is determined by a complex interaction of a number of independent sources of risk aversion.
This paper examines the extension of the concepts of risk aversion within the framework of
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) which combines reference
dependence, loss aversion and rank-dependence. The e¤ect of the probability weighting com-
ponent of CPT on the risk premium has already been partially investigated by Levy and Levy
(2002), although their application of CPT is awed in places. This paper will both correct and
extend their analysis. In continuous CPT (Davies and Satchell 2002) the question of whether the
subject is risk averse or risk seeking for a given prospect may depend in a complex way on the
interaction between the utility functions for gains and losses, the probability weighting function,
and the shape of the distribution.
In section 1 below we introduce continuous CPT and its behavioural components of reference
dependence, loss aversion, utility curvature and subjective probability distortions. We then
dene and provide general solutions for both the objective risk premium which reveals the true
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amount of risk attitude displayed by the decision maker, and the subjective risk premium which
indicates the decision makers own assessment of her risk attitude. The di¤erence between these
two concepts we term the subjectivity premium.
In section 2 we follow Pratts (1964) methodology for obtaining approximate local solutions
for the risk premium. We analyse rst in section 2.1 the situation in which there is no re-
weighting of probabilities, and provide the su¢ cient conditions on loss aversion and the shape
of the utility functions to guarantee local risk aversion at the reference point. These conditions
are analogous to the traditional Pratt-Arrow condition of concavity of the utility function, but
in our more complex behavioural model restrictions are required on both loss aversion, and the
curvature of gains and losses separately. The Pratt-Arrow risk premium is shown to be a special
case of the CPT risk premium. For completeness we provide a characterisation for local risk
aversion away from the reference point, and show that this collapses to the special case of the
standard Pratt-Arrow risk premium.
Thereafter in section 2.2 we introduce the full CPT model with decision weights and discuss
the previous work of Levy and Levy in this regard before providing comprehensive approximate
results for both the objective and subjective risk premia at the reference point. The introduction
of probability distortions changes the su¢ ciency conditions that apply without decision weights
such that they are reliant on the way in which the probability distribution is distorted, and
therefore on the slope of the decision weighting function at the reference point. We show how
the conditions are altered by the asymmetry (through the probability of obtaining a gain rather
than a loss) of the underlying distributions.
Section 3 provides an example illustrating the role of the components of the risk premium in
nancial decision making where specic assumptions are made regarding the parametric forms
of the utility and probability weighting functions. Section 4 concludes.
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1 Behavioural Risk Aversion
1.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Under continuous cumulative prospect theory a continuous prospect 	 with possible outcomes
distributed on the set of real numbers is evaluated in relation to a reference point using a utility
function that is dened over the change that each possible outcome represents from the reference
point, and a non-linear transformation of the probability distribution. In this formulation a
single prospect will be evaluated di¤erently from di¤erent reference points. This dependence on
the reference point has been frequently referred to in the literature, but little work has attempted
for formalise the relationship between the reference point and the evaluation of prospects (recent
exceptions being Schmidt 2003 and Sugden 2003). The valuation of prospect 	 in continuous
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) may be given by:
Vy [	] =
Z
v (x)m (x) f (x) dx (1)
where the outcomes values, x, are the deviations of the possible values of the distribution
(represented by 	) from the reference point. Thus, if the reference point is current wealth y =W0
then the values taken by the random variable x will be the absolute outcomes of 	 with negative
outcomes coded as losses from the status quo point and positive outcomes coded as gains. If,
as is a more frequent assumption in nance, the reference point is the future value of current
wealth if invested at the risk free rate rf until the resolution of the prospect (to account for the
value of time), then x are the deviations from y =W0 (1 + rf ) where rf is the risk free rate that
applies the period of time between the decision point, and the resolution of the prospect.
v (x) is the value to the decision maker of each possible realised outcome x.
v(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
v+(x), if x > 0
0, if x = 0
v (x), if x < 0
(2)
It is continuous and monotonically increasing with v (0) = 0. The most common restrictions on
the form of v (x) are diminishing sensitivity away from the reference point (i.e., it is concave
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for gains and convex for losses) and loss aversion (it is steeper for losses than for gains). These
distinctions between losses and gains require separate functions to be used above and below
the reference point. Following Köbberling and Wakker (2003) we separate out the risk attitude
that arises from the attribution of basic utility to gains and losses (achieved through v+(x) and
v (x)) from that due to loss aversion (governed by ). With this decomposition it is possible to
have two individuals with identical risk attitudes to all gains-only and loss-only prospects, but
di¤erent attitudes with regard to mixed prospects. Loss aversion exists for  > 1 and Vy [	;]
is decreasing in  as v (x) < 0 for all x < 0.
m (x) is a multiplier of the objective probability density function, f (x), that reects rank-
dependent distortions of objective probability to result in an imputed subjective distribution (see
Davies and Satchell 2003). It is dened as follows:
m (x) =
8><>: m+ (x) = w
0
+ (1  F (x)) for all x  0
m  (x) = w0  (F (x)) for all x < 0
(3)
w+ and w  are two strictly increasing weighting functions [0; 1]  R ! [0; 1] with w+ (0) =
w  (0) = 0 and w+ (1) = w  (1) = 1. They govern the way in which the cumulative probabilities
are transformed subjectively and in Tversky and Kahnemans original model are presumed to be
inverse-S shaped which is indicative of increased attention being given to the extreme outcomes
of the distribution. F (x) is the cumulative probability distribution of x, and f (x) the associated
density function.
1.2 Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is assessed according to whether the subjects evaluation of the prospect 	 is
greater than or less than the utility of the expected value of the prospect. Thus, risk aversion
may be characterised as:
v (Ey [	]) > Vy [	] , or,
v
Z
xf (x) dx

>
Z 0
 1
v  (x)m  (x) f (x) dx
+
Z 1
0
v+ (x)m+ (x) f (x) dx (4)
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The left hand side is the evaluation of the mathematical expected value of the distribution.
This evaluation uses the same value function, v, as on the right hand side and, as such, the
shape di¤ers according to whether the expected value is positive or negative. Notice, too, that
the expectation is taken for the outcomes, x, dened as the deviation of the prospect outcomes
from the reference point. Thus Ey [	] is dependent on the reference point. The right hand side
is the subjects evaluation of the prospect according to CPT. If we make a further assumption
that probability is always treated objectively, then this model may be considerably simplied as
m  and m+ are everywhere equal to 1.
Using this formulation the risk premium r	, for the prospect 	 is the certain amount the
decision maker would require in order to be indi¤erent between choosing the prospect 	, or
receiving an amount equal to its expected value minus the risk premium. If r	 is positive then
the decision maker is said to be risk averse.
r	 for 	 is dened by:
v
 
Ey [	]  r	

= Vy [	] , or, (5)
v
Z
xf (x) dx  r	

=
Z 0
 1
v  (x)m  (x) f (x) dx
+
Z 1
0
v+ (x)m+ (x) f (x) dx
Adapting a concept introduced by Hilton (1988) we also dene the subjective risk premium,
r	S in this context:
v
 
Esy [	]  r	S

= Vy [	] (6)
Esy [	] is the subjective expected value of the prospect by the decision maker:
Esy [	] =
Z
xm (x) f (x) dx
rather than the objective expected utility Ey [	] =
Z
xf (x) dx.
This allows us to separate out the e¤ect of subjective probability weighting so that r	S rep-
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resents the traditional Pratt-Arrow risk premium for that decision maker. That is, the risk
premium when the decision makers subjective probability assessment is taken to be the point of
comparison. The sign of this Pratt-Arrow risk premium will be di¤erent depending on whether
the decision maker believes herself to be risk averse or risk seeking. This may di¤er from whether
the decision maker is actually risk seeking or risk averse in an objective sense, relative to the true
expected value. It is the subjective risk premium that is employed by Levy and Levy (2002).
We shall investigate both variations below.
1.2.1 General Solutions
Thus far we have characterised the risk attitudes of the decision maker with respect to the
expected value of the prospect which is faced. In other words it tells us whether the decision
maker would prefer the expected value of the prospect to the prospect itself and by how much.
We can use the denition of the risk premium (5) to examine the concept further in the case
of reference dependent preferences. The objective risk premium is given by:
r	S = Ey [	]  v 1 (Vy [	])
and risk aversion in general implies
Ey [	]  v 1 (Vy [	]) > 0
v (Ey [	]) > Vy [	]
To examine these concepts further we note that there are four possible cases.
Case 1a: r	 < Ey [	] and Ey [	] > 0. Note that in this case the expected value of the
prospect is necessarily positive if the decision maker is risk averse (as r	 > 0) and that the
subjective evaluation of the prospect, Vy [	], is positive. The left hand side of (5) is evaluated
using the gains value function:
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v+
 
Ey [	]  r	

= Vy [	]
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1+ (Vy [	]) (7)
In this case risk aversion implies:
Ey [	]  v 1+ [Vy [	]] > 0
v+ (Ey [	]) > Vy [	] (8)
and risk seeking (r	 < 0 < Ey [	]) implies
v+ (Ey [	]) < Vy [	] (9)
Case 1b: If r	 < Ey [	] and Ey [	] < 0 the decision maker is necessarily risk seeking. In
this case
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1+ (Vy [	])
and risk seeking has
v  (Ey [	]) > Vy [	]
Case 2a: If r	 > Ey [	] and Ey [	] < 0 we are in the domain of losses and the evaluation
becomes:
v 
 
Ey [	]  r	

= Vy [	] (10)
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1 

Vy [	]


(11)
risk aversion implies:
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Ey [	]  v 1 

Vy [	]


> 0
v_ (Ey [	]) > Vy [	] (12)
and for risk seeking behaviour:
v_ (Ey [	]) < Vy [	] (13)
Case 2b: Finally, if r	 > Ey [	] and Ey [	] > 0 only risk aversion is possible:
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1 

Vy [	]


and
v+ (Ey [	]) > Vy [	]
It is important to note that in this model the concept of risk aversion is not independent
of the distribution itself - this is not the case in EUT where the degree of risk aversion can be
determined solely from the utility functions of di¤erent individuals.
All of these cases will also hold for the subjective risk premium if the objective expected value
Ey [	] is replaced everywhere by the subjective counterpart Esy [	].
Using the distinction between the objective risk premium r	 and the subjective (Pratt-Arrow)
risk premium r	S we can calculate the degree to which the decision makers beliefs about their
own risk aversion di¤er from their actual risk-aversion when compared to the true distribution.
We term this the Subjectivity Premium r	
r	 = r
	   r	S = Ey [	]  Esy [	] =
Z
xf (x) dx 
Z
xm (x) f (x) dx (14)
It is important to note that r	 does not answer the question of how introducing decision
weights to the model a¤ects the risk premium. This needs to be done by comparing either
r	or r	S , when calculated using probability transformations, to the situation where there are no
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probability transformations at all (i.e., when evaluating the prospect using Vy [	] with m  and
m+ equal to 1 for all x). In deriving any of the three premia given above, the value of the prospect
Vy [	] always incorporates decision weights rather than objective probabilities. The distinction
is rather whether the risk premium related to this value is relative to the actual expected value
of the prospect, or to the decision makers subjective assessment of this expected value. That
is, not whether the risk premium is a¤ected by probability distortions, but whether the risk
attitude is that which the subject perceives herself to hold, or that which would be observed by
an external observer.
2 Approximate Solutions
Whilst (5) is the exact equation for the risk premium for a particular prospect, solutions can
only be obtained for certain specications of the utility function and probability distribution.
Following Pratt (1964) we can make more general statements about the shape of these functions
if we restrict our analysis to "small prospects", that is, those with extremely small variance. This
enables us to examine local risk attitude at a specic point. Initially, we restrict our analysis
to local risk attitude at the reference point itself. In other words we are interested in the risk
attitude to a small prospect with an expected value of zero relative to the reference point.
In what follows we rst explore these issues in the simpler world where probability is always
treated objectively (m  = m+ = 1). Let 	" denote the prospect formed by a random variable
of outcomes with Ey [	"] = E ["] = 0 and innitesimally small variance such that E

"2

is
negligible. This can be extended to the more general cases, and we examine the case where the
small prospect is not centred on the reference point (i.e., where E ["] 6= 0) in section 3.1.2 below.
Thereafter we reintroduce subjective probability weighting into the analysis. We rst discuss
the results of Levy and Levy in relationship to the subjective (Pratt-Arrow) risk premium and
decision weights in section 3.2.1, we then extend their analysis to include the distinction between
di¤erent utility curvatures for gains and losses, and the concept of loss aversion in the same way
as we had previously analysed in the objective cases in 3.2.2. This analysis is completed for both
the objective and subjective risk premia.
12
2.1 Risk Aversion with No Probability Distortion
2.1.1 At Reference Point
Case 1 From the above denition of the risk premium, if E ["]  r	 > 0 then the individual is
risk seeking for this gamble. Thus, denoting the probability of a gain by p; the risk premium is
dened by:
v+
 
E ["]  r	 = (1  p)Ey [v  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [v+(") j" > 0 ]
v+
  r	 = (1  p)Ey [v  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [v+(") j" > 0 ]
Taking a rst order Taylor approximation around the reference point (i.e., around 0) on the
left hand side of the equation yields
LHS  v+ (0)  v0+ (0) r	
And a second order approximation around the reference point on the right hand side gives
RHS  Ey

v  (0) + v0  (0) ("j " < 0) +
1
2
v00  (0)
 
"2
 " < 0 (1  p)
+Ey

v+ (0) + v
0
+ (0) ("j " > 0) +
1
2
v00+ (0)
 
"2
 " > 0 p (15)
Because v (0) = 0 (??), LHS  RHS implies
 v0+ (0) r	 

v0  (0)Ey ["j " < 0] +
1
2
v00  (0)Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p)
+

v0+ (0)Ey ["j " > 0] +
1
2
v00+ (0)Ey

"2
 " > 0 p
r	   
0B@

v0 (0)
v0+(0)
Ey ["j " < 0] + v
00
 (0)
2v0+(0)
Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p)
+

Ey ["j " > 0] + v
00
+(0)
2v0+(0)
Ey

"2
 " > 0 p
1CA (16)
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Since " is a zero-mean random variable, Ey ["j " < 0] (1  p) =  Ey ["j " > 0] p, which allows
this to be further simplied to
r	  Ey ["j " > 0] p

v0  (0)
v0+ (0)
  1

(17)
 1
2

v00  (0)
v0+ (0)
Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p) + v00+ (0)
v0+ (0)
Ey

"2
 " > 0 p
Furthermore, if we follow the suggestion of Köbberling and Wakker (2003) that we adopt a
scaling convention for loss aversion such that the index of loss aversion  is captured by the ratio
of the slope of the utility function from below at 0 (v0" (0)) to the slope of the utility function
from above at 0 (v0# (0)), then we must have,
 =
v0" (0)
v0# (0)
 =
v0  (0)
v0+ (0)
, and so,
v0  (0) = v
0
+ (0) = v
0 (0) (18)
This places restrictions on the permissible forms of v (x), but has a number of advantages in that
the risk attitude due to loss aversion in mixed prospects can be precisely separated from that
due to utility curvature in gains-only or loss-only prospects in a way that is independent of the
choice of unit. Using this convention, (17) becomes
r	  (  1) pEy ["j " > 0] (19)
 1
2

v00  (0)
v0 (0)
 (1  p)Ey

"2
 " < 0+ v00+ (0)
v0 (0)
pEy

"2
 " > 0
Case 2 Similarly, if Ey [	]  r	 < 0, then r	 > 0; LHS   v0  (0) r	 and the second order
approximation for RHS remains the same (15). Thus
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r	   
0B@

Ey ["j " < 0] + v
00
 (0)
2v0 (0)
Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p)
+ 1

v0+(0)
v0 (0)
Ey ["j " > 0] + v
00
+(0)
2v0 (0)
Ey

"2
 " > 0 p
1CA
r	  Ey ["j " > 0] p

1  v
0
+ (0)
v0  (0)

(20)
 1
2

v00  (0)
v0  (0)
Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p) + v00+ (0)
v0  (0)
Ey

"2
 " > 0 p
And with Köbberling and Wakkers index of loss aversion:
r	 

1  1


pEy ["j " > 0] (21)
 1
2

v00  (0)
v0 (0)
(1  p)Ey

"2
 " < 0+ v00+ (0)
v0 (0)
pEy

"2
 " > 0
Implications Examining these results enables us to give the su¢ cient conditions on the shape
of the utility functions and on the loss aversion parameter to guarantee risk aversion for small
prospects. These results are analogous to the condition of concavity of the utility function given
by Pratt and Arrow for the more simple case where utility is attributed to total wealth rather
than changes in wealth. These conditions are summarised in the propositions below.
Proposition 1 If we have a monotonically increasing utility function
v(") =
8><>: v+("), if " > 0v ("), if "  0 (22)
v(0) = 0
and face a gamble with outcomes distributed according a random variable " representing deviations
from the reference point y. The gamble has zero mean, Ey [	"] = E (") = 0 and innitessimal
variance, and
a)
 > 1 (23)
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b)
v00+ (0) < 0 and v
00
  (0) < 0 (24)
then the risk premium is positive, r	 > 0 (i.e., the individual is locally risk-averse for small
changes in wealth)
Proof. Insert (23) and (24) into (21). p, and Ey ["j " > 0], are greater than zero, and v0+ (0), and
v0  (0) are also positive since v (") is monotonically increasing. Thus (23) is su¢ cient to ensure
that the rst term is positive. In addition, since (1  p), Ey

"2
 " < 0, and Ey "2 " > 0 are
positive, (24) is su¢ cient to ensure that the second term in brackets is negative, guaranteeing
that the expressions as a whole will be positive.
This violates the premise of Case 1 that r	 < 0, but allows that of Case 2 that r	 > 0. Thus,
these conditions are su¢ cient to ensure that the individual will pay to avoid a fair gamble (with
respect to the reference point) for small changes to expected wealth from the reference point.
The terms on the right hand sides of (19) and (21) are analogous to the Pratt-Arrow risk
premium. In the standard Pratt-Arrow framework, concavity of the utility function is su¢ cient
to ensure risk aversion and thereby a positive risk premium. With the addition of a reference
point to divide outcomes into gains or losses, however, the rst terms in these equations also
need to be positive and this condition is neither necessary nor su¢ cient. To ensure local risk
aversion for a small prospect it must also be the case that loss aversion exists (making the rst
term positive).
Loss aversion is central to Kahneman and Tverskys Prospect Theory and has a great deal
of empirical support. Köbberling and Wakker motivate their proposed index of loss aversion,
 =
v0"(0)
v0#(0)
, by pointing out that this measure allows us to dene loss aversion independently of
the unit of payment. This is not true of the most common version of CPT due to Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) where they assume that v+ (x) = x for gains and v  (x) =   j xj
for losses. With this formulation v (1) =  v ( 1) = 1, which implies a scaling convention such
that  =  v( 1)v(1) . This convention is not independent of the unit of payment. Both measures
allow loss aversion to be neatly separated from the attribution of basic utility to gains and
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losses independently. In particular Köbberling and Wakker show that these measures allow us
to characterise individuals with identical preferences for all gains-only and loss-only prospects
whilst di¤ering in their preferences for mixed prospects. However, in the class of measures that
have this property, only the ratio of slopes at the origin is independent of the unit chosen for
payment. Our analysis provides another reason for this measure: the ratio arises naturally in the
approximate solutions for the risk premium (Equations (21) and (19)), and choosing this as our
denition of loss aversion enables us to simply and elegantly express the e¤ect of loss aversion
on the risk premium. That is, in proposition 1, our scaling convention for loss aversion enables
condition a) to be  > 1, rather than  >
v0+(0)
v0 (0)
.
This denition of loss aversion, whilst possessing a number of desirable properties, does imply
some restrictions on the parametric forms that can be taken by the functions assigning basic
utility, v+ (x) and v  (x). In particular, as discussed by Köbberling and Wakker, this form of the
loss aversion index implies considerable di¢ culties for the commonly utilised constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) power utility functions. These forms have zero or innite derivatives at
zero if the power is not one. This means that unless the curvature parameter for gains is equal
to that for losses, then the loss aversion index is either zero or innite and it is impossible to
dene a basic utility function independently of loss aversion. They demonstrate, however, that
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions (i.e., exponential) do not face these
problems at the reference point.
The e¤ect of loss aversion on the risk premium is clear, it increases the risk premium. However,
another central intuition behind Prospect Theory, namely diminishing sensitivity to outcomes
from the reference point, has an indeterminate e¤ect on the risk premium. This intuition re-
quires that the utility function is concave above the reference point, but convex below. Thus
decision makers are risk averse to gambles with only gains outcomes, and risk-seeking for loss-
only gambles. This makes the sign of the Pratt-Arrow part of the risk premium indeterminate
when combined with the notion of diminishing sensitivity.
Notice, too, that this proposition may be derived using either Case 1 or Case 2. However, if
conditions a) and b) hold and the decision maker is thus locally risk averse, then the actual value
of the risk premium is determined from (21) in Case 2 where r	 > 0. Since these conditions are
su¢ cient, but not necessary there may be instances where they do not hold but where the risk
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premium is positive.
The su¢ ciency conditions for risk-seeking are derived similarly,
Proposition 2 If we have a monotonically increasing utility function
v(") =
8><>: v+("), if " > 0v  (") , if "  0 (25)
v(0) = 0
and face a gamble with outcomes distributed according a random variable " representing deviations
from the reference point y. The gamble has zero mean, Ey [	"] = E (") = 0 and innitessimal
variance, and
c)
 < 1 (26)
d)
v00+ (0) > 0 and v
00
  (0) > 0 (27)
then r	 < 0 and the risk premium is negative (i.e., the individual is locally risk-loving for small
changes in wealth)
Proof. As for Proposition 1
We can further strengthen condition b) if in addition to being an actuarially fair gamble,
E ["] = 0, we also assume that the following symmetry holds over the distribution: pE

"2 j" > 0 =
(1  p)E "2 j" < 0 1 In this case 19 simplies to:
r	   2   1 pEy ["j " > 0]
 1
2

v00  (0)
v0+ (0)
 (1  p)Ey

"2
 " < 0+ v00+ (0)
v0+ (0)
pEy

"2
 " > 0
r	   2   1 pEy ["j " > 0]  v00  (0) + v00+ (0)
2v0+ (0)
pEy

"2 j" > 0 (28)
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and condition b) can be strengthened to
v00  (0) + v
00
+ (0) < 0 (29)
Proposition 3 If we have a monotonically increasing utility function
v(") =
8><>: v+("), if " > 0v ("), if "  0 (30)
v(0) = 0
and face a gamble with outcomes distributed according a random variable " representing deviations
from the reference point y. The gamble has zero mean, Ey [	"] = E (") = 0, innitessimal
variance, and symmetry around 0 in the sense that pE

"2 j" > 0 = (1  p)E "2 j" < 0, and
e)
 > 1 (31)
f)
v00  (0) + v
00
+ (0) < 0 (32)
then the risk premium is positive, r	 > 0 (i.e., the individual is locally risk-averse for small
changes in wealth)
Condition f) is a less onerous condition than b) as it does not require that both v00  (0) and
v00+ (0) are locally concave, but rather that any local convexity must be outweighed by local
concavity after taking loss aversion into account.
Similarly, Proposition 2 becomes
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Proposition 4 If we have a monotonically increasing utility function
v(") =
8><>: v+("), if " > 0v  (") , if "  0 (33)
v(0) = 0
and face a gamble with outcomes distributed according a random variable " representing deviations
from the reference point y. The gamble has zero mean, Ey [	"] = E (") = 0, innitessimal
variance, and symmetry around 0 in the sense that pE

"2 j" > 0 = (1  p)E "2 j" < 0, and
c)
 < 1 (34)
d)
v00  (0) + v
00
+ (0) > 0 (35)
then r	 < 0 and the risk premium is negative (i.e., the individual is locally risk-loving for small
changes in wealth)
Standard Pratt-Arrow Risk Premium as a Special Case In standard Expected Utility
Theory, absolute risk aversion is measured by the Pratt-Arrow coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion,
which at x is dened as rA (x) =  v00 (x) =v0 (x). When measured at x = 0 the Pratt-Arrow
measure is related to a special case of the risk premium as described above. Specically, if the
following three conditions hold, the risk premium has a one-to-one relation to the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion measured at the reference point:
Condition 5 v0# (0) = v
0
" (0) = v
0 (0), that is,  = 1 (The slope of the utility function at the
reference point is identical for small gains and losses)
Condition 6 v00+ (0) = v
00
  (0) = v
00 (0) (The curvature of the utility function at the reference
point is identical for gains and losses)
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Condition 7 E

"2
 " > 0 p = E "2 " < 0 (1  p) = 22 (The outcomes are symmetrical about
the reference point - thus p = 12)
With these conditions we can specialise (19) and (21) to obtain,
r	 =   v
00 (0)
2v0 (0)
2
= rA (0)
2
2
(36)
Thus, for any given distribution the higher the aversion to risk, the greater the risk premium
required for the individual to take the gamble. This is the classical result of Pratt and Arrow.
2.1.2 Local Risk Aversion Away from the Reference Point
The discussion above centres on local risk aversion for small prospects at the reference point
(i.e., with E ["] = 0). However, this is a special case and we need to be able to examine local
risk premia for points that are distinct from the reference point. For example, what conditions
on the utility function are su¢ cient for risk aversion when evaluating a gamble with a positive
expected return relative to the reference point?
v
 
E ["]  r	 = Ey [v (")]
Unlike the situation where the expected value of the random variable is equal to the reference
point, the RHS of this expression uses only v+ (") or v  (") to evaluate the random variable.
This is because, with innitessimal variance a positive mean implies that all outcomes will be
positive, whereas with a negative mean all outcomes are negative.
Taking a rst order Taylor approximation around E ["] on the left hand side yields
LHS  v (E ["]) +   E ["]  r	  E ["] v0 (E ["])
 v (E ["])  r	v0 (E ["])
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And a second order approximation around E ["] on the right hand side gives
RHS  Ey

v (E ["]) + v0 (E ["]) ("  E ["]) + 1
2
v00 (E ["]) ("  E ["])2

(37)
LHS  RHS implies
v (E ["])  r	v0 (E ["])  v (E ["]) + v0 (E ["])Ey [("  E ["])]
+
1
2
v00 (E ["])Ey
h
("  E ["])2
i
r	   Ey [("  E ["])]  1
2
v00 (E ["])
v0 (E ["])
Ey
h
("  E ["])2
i
r	   1
2
v00 (E ["])
v0 (E ["])
2 (38)
Again, there are two important cases here. If E ["] < 0, then this is evaluated as
r	   1
2
v00  (E ["])
v0  (E ["])
2
whereas if the expected value is positive, then the gains functions are used:
r	   1
2
v00+ (E ["])
v0+ (E ["])
2
Note that in the rst of these equations the loss aversion parameters on the top and bottom
cancel out. This reects the fact that the evaluation is entirely in losses, and therefore loss
aversion has no e¤ect (it only a¤ects decision making for mixed prospects).
This result is exactly analogous to the Pratt-Arrow risk premium, except for the specication
that the value function is dened for gains or losses as appropriate. Thus the individual is locally
risk averse if and only if the utility function for gains is concave at that point. Note that the
prospect is being evaluated from the reference point which is distinct from the expected outcome.
So, for small prospects it is only at the reference point that the sign of the local risk premium
is dependent on both the gains and loss utility functions. It is also important that, at this point it
is not only the curvature of these functions that matters, but also the ratio of the slopes. Lastly,
unlike the Pratt-Arrow risk premium, in reference dependent utility, constraints on the value
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function are no longer both necessary and su¢ cient to determine the sign of the risk premium -
the constraints given are su¢ cient, but not necessary.
2.2 Non-Linear Probability Weighting
2.2.1 Previous Analysis - Levy and Levy
Arrows Approach Levy and Levy (2002) investigate a restricted version of this problem using
the two di¤ering approaches of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964). Arrows approach considers a
bet with only two outcomes of +h and  h, where h is vanishingly small. In our analysis we
have used Pratts more general approach where a distribution with innitessimal variance is
considered and, with the exception of a brief discussion here of Levy and Levys results using the
Arrow approach, will continue to employ Pratts methodology in the remainder of the paper.
Arrows original risk premium refers to the increase in probability above 50% for the positive
value of the bet, h, that is required to induce the decision maker to accept the bet. Thus, it is
the value of p   12 where p = 12 is risk neutrality and p > (<) 12 represents risk aversion (risk
seeking). Arrow showed that p  12   v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
4 . The risk premium in this context relates to the
amount of increase in the expected value of the bet represented by the prospect ( h; 1  p;h; p)
over that of the fair bet ( h; 50%;h; 50%). Thus, the higher the value of p, required to induce
the decision maker to take the bet, the greater the expected utility the decision maker will forego
to avoid the gamble.
Levy and Levy investigate only the role of decision weighting on the risk premium, and do
not distinguish between potential changes in the curvature of the utility function above and
below the reference point, nor do they incorporate loss aversion into their analysis. The primary
conclusion of employing Arrows approach is that the probability distortion induced by CPT
"systematically increases Arrows risk premium", which is dened as p0   12 , where p0 is the
solution to
w+ (p0)  w  (1  p0)   v
00 (W )
v0 (W )
h
2
(39)
and W is current wealth2 . That is, they show that p0 > p.
Some aspects of their analysis require further comment. Firstly, if current wealth is taken to
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be the reference point, (39) becomes
w+ (p0)  w  (1  p0)   v
00 (0)
v0 (0)
h
2
(40)
This requires either that the utility function is continuous and di¤erentiable at 0, or that further
analysis is made to dene whether the derivatives of the utility function are taken from the
left or the right of the reference point. Levy and Levy do not incorporate reference dependent
utility functions (though they do make use of a distinction between gains and losses), and thus
implicitly make the rst assumption.
Secondly their solution for the Arrow risk premium requires that the decision weights are nor-
malised so that they add up to unity. This is only required if W is taken to be at the reference
point. If this is not the case the small prospect will consist entirely of gains or entirely of losses,
and the decision weights will always sum to one, so we infer that they intend the analysis to apply
at a reference point. For this simple binary prospect the normalisation requires that the adjusted
weights used in (39) are derived from the unadjusted CPT weights, w+ (p) and w  (1  p), by
w+ (p0) = w+ (p) = (w+ (p) + w  (1  p)) and w  (p) = w  (p) = (w+ (p) + w  (1  p)). As a
rationale for this move they argue in a note that Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose this nor-
malisation in order to overcome technical drawbacks of the original Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). A reading of the original text reveals that Tversky and Kahneman do indeed
allow that this normalisation can be e¤ective in overcoming problems of the original Prospect
Theory, but argue that this can be done better through using the alternative rank-dependent
functional in Cumulative Prospect Theory. CPT replaces the need to normalise the probabilities
to unity, and such a normalisation is not supported within CPT. I quote the relevant passage in
full:
These problems [in 1979 Prospect Theory] can be handled by assuming that trans-
parently dominated prospects are eliminated in the editing phase, and by normalizing
the weights so they add to unity. Alternatively, both problems can be solved by the
rank-dependent or cumulative functional.
On the very next page they state that "For mixed prospects, however, the sum can be either
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smaller or greater than 1, because the decision weights for gains and for losses are dened by
separate capacities."
The "normalisation" employed by Levy and Levy cannot be justied within the framework
of CPT, but requires additional justication, which has not been provided by Tversky and Kah-
neman. In fact, because adjusting the decision weights in this way changes the CPT valuations
given to mixed prospects (though not to gains-only or loss-only prospects for which the decision
weights will always sum to unity) it may also change the preference ranking between prospects
and thus is not a neutral "normalisation" at all.
To demonstrate that this may occur, consider the choice between the prospect
f = ( 100; 25%; 100; 75%)
and the prospect
g = ( 50; 95%; 550; 5%)
These choice of values have been chosen to provide a simple example of where the normalisation
employed by Levy and Levy might lead to a switch in the predicted preference ordering in CPT
even for binary prospects. For simplicity I assume a linear utility function, so the utility of the
gains and losses in the two prospects may be utilised directly. This is without loss of generality as
one could always determine the monetary outcomes required to produce the appropriate utility
gures by taking the inverse of any (reference dependent and loss averse) utility function. I
use the weighting functions used by Levy and Levy (that is, those suggested by Tversky and
Kahneman 1992):
w  (p) =
p
p + (1  p)
 1

w+ (p) =
p
(p + (1  p)) 1
where p is a cumulative probability for losses, and a decumulative probability for gains, and
 = 0:69,  = 0:61.
25
With these assumptions f is evaluated as:
V (f) =  100   w  (0)+ 100   w+ (0)
=  100w  (25%) + 100w+ (75%)
Similarly g is:
V (g) =  50w  (95%) + 550w+ (5%)
The unadjusted decision weights are w  (25%) = 0:294, w  (95%) = 0:850, w+ (75%) =
0:568, w+ (5%) = 0:132, and the "normalised" weights are: w  (25%) = 0:341, w  (95%) =
0:866, w+ (75%) = 0:659, w+ (5%) = 0:134. Note that the transformation has a comeasurately
larger e¤ect on the probability weight used in f , than in g.
The resulting CPT evaluations of the two prospects before normalisation are V (f) = 27:475,
and V (g) = 29:900. The decision maker would thus choose g. However, using the adjusted
decision weights we obtain V  (f) = 31:881, and V  (g) = 30:463: in this case the decision maker
would choose prospect f . This demonstrates that the adjustment used by Levy and Levy is not
neutral with regard to preference ordering, and is thus neither a normalisation, nor justied.
In and endnote to their paper they provide the equivalent result to (39) where the decision
weight adjustment is not employed:
w+ (p0)  w  (1  p0)   v
00 (0)
v0 (0)
h
2

w+ (p0) + w
  (1  p0)

  v (0)
v0 (0)
1
h

w+ (p0) + w
  (1  p0)  1

w+ (p0)  w  (1  p0)   v
00 (0)
v0 (0)
h
2

w+ (p0) + w
  (1  p0)

w+ (p0)  w  (1  p0)
w+ (p0) + w  (1  p0)   
v00 (0)
v0 (0)
h
2
(41)
The second line follows from the fact that in CPT v (0) = 0 (a valid normalisation within
the theory due to the non-uniqueness of the utility function to an a¢ ne transformation). Away
from the reference point the small prospect used by Arrow lies entirely in gains or in losses and
the decision weights thus sum to unity resulting in Levy and Levys original formula, (39).
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Although the changes required by the non-validity of the decision weight adjustments require
an adjustment to (40), the result they report remains unchanged. That is, for the domain of
risk aversion (where p > 12 ) the CPT probability distortion systematically increases Arrows risk
premium. However, even in their original analysis this was not true where Arrows risk premium
was negative - here the probability distortion could either increase or decrease the risk premium.
In addition, their result is very dependent on the precise values used for  and .
Both these points can be illustrated using the graphical analysis of Levy and Levy. Recall
that the Arrow risk premium is dened as p  12   v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
4 , or equivalently 2p  1   v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 .
The value of p for which this is approximately true may be compared directly to the value of p0
which solves (41). If p0 is required to be greater than p to give a particular value of  v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 ,
then the CPT distortion increases Arrows risk premium. That is, the decision maker is more
risk averse, or less risk seeking as appropriate. Figure 1 graphs 2p   1 and w+(p0) w (1 p0)w+(p0)+w (1 p0) for
all values of p and p0.
Insert Figure 1 here
As can be seen from the gure, p0 > p for all cases where Arrows risk premium is positive.
This is the conclusion of Levy and Levy. For decision makers close to risk neutrality (near
 v00(0)v0(0) h2 = 0) there is an area where p < 12 , but p0 > 12 . Here probability distortion causes a
mild risk seeker to be become mildly risk averse. However, where decision makers are su¢ ciently
risk seeking, CPT decision weights actually decrease the risk premium and make the decision
maker more strongly risk seeking.
In Figure 1 we have employed the same values of  = 0:69, and  = 0:61 as used by Levy and
Levy. However, Figure 2 shows that their conclusion is very sensitive to these values. Reversing
the the values for gains and losses (to  = 0:61, and  = 0:69) means that their conclusion no
longer holds and, for low levels of Arrow risk aversion, CPT decision weights actually decrease
the risk premium. In fact, Levy and Levys conclusion holds if and only if   . The values they
utilised were the median estimates on empirical data by Tversky and Kahneman. Subsequent
investigation on the decision weighting function has shown that, whilst this values do t median
data relatively well, there is a very broad range of individual variation and that    certainly
cannot be taken for granted. (Abdellaoui 2000, Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Wu and Gonzalez 1996,
1999).
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Insert Figure 2
Pratts Approach Levy and Levy also analyse Pratts approach to the risk premium, using
small distributions of outcomes as we have done in Section 3 above. Again abstracting from
issues of reference dependence and loss aversion, they seek to examine the e¤ect of CPT decision
weight on Pratts risk premium. Recall that the subjective risk premium may be dened as
v
 
Esy [	]  r	S

= Vy [	]
They do not solve this equation for the risk premium explicitly, but rather show through the
means of examples that the risk premium that attained may be either greater than or less than
the standard Pratt risk premium in a model where no probability transformations take place.
Specically they look not at the risk premium itself, but at the market risk premium. That is,
at the percentage premium of the expected value of the prospect to its subjective value. For the
standard Pratt risk premium this is:
mp =
Ey [	]
Ey [	]  r   1
where r is the risk premium where no probability transformations are used in the valuation of the
prospect. For a risk averse individual r is positive, and Ey [	] r is the certain amount for which
this individual is indi¤erent to taking the gamble, which will thus be lower than the expected
value. mp is thus the percentage premium implied by this degree of risk aversion. With CPT
probability distortions the market premium, mp0, is
mp0 =
Ey [	]
Esy [	]  r	S
  1 = Ey [	]
Ey [	]  r	   1 (42)
Note that, although Levy and Levy use the subjective risk premium, the market risk pre-
mium remains the same regardless of whether the objective or subjective risk premium is used
- the di¤erence between the risk premia is exactly o¤set (denitionally) by the di¤erence in the
expected value used as the point of comparison.
Levy and Levy do not face the problem of probability "normalisations" in their examples
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here, as they use gains-only prospects in their analysis and their conclusion is that CPT decision
weights may either increase or decrease the market risk premium, and thus the risk premium
itself, We will now proceed in the next section to analyse these results in a generalised context,
quantifying the e¤ect on the risk premium of decision weights as well as reference dependent
utility and loss aversion, all in the context of both the subjective and objective risk premia.
2.2.2 Comprehensive Approximate Solutions with Non-linear Probability Weight-
ings
Objective Risk Premium In section 3 we provided a characterisation of the risk premium
for small prospects in the case where there is no non-linear probability transformation. It still
remains to ask what holds if the full CPT framework is applied, that is, in a world of non-linear
probability weighting. We focus rst on the objective risk premium. That is, the risk premium
relative to the objective expected value of the distribution. This measure, r	, tells us the degree
to which the decision maker actually displays risk aversion or risk seeking behaviour. This may
di¤er from the subjective risk premium, r	S which indicates the degree to which the decision
maker believes themselves to be risk averse or risk seeking (i.e., the risk premium is measured
relative to the subjective expected value). In the case with CPT decision weights the approximate
solutions from section 3 become more complex:
v
 
Ey [	"]  r	

= (1  p)Ey [v  (")m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [v+(")m+ (") j" > 0 ]
v
  r	 = (1  p)Ey [v  (")m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [v+(")m+ (") j" > 0 ]
recalling that
m (x) =
8><>: m+ (x) = w
0
+ (1  F (x)) for all x  0
m  (x) = w0  (F (x)) for all x < 0
Considering only Case 2 where r	 > 0 (the analysis extends to the opposite case as before),
the LHS approximation remains the same (as there is no uncertainty in the risk premium, and
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therefore no reweighting of probabilities). The RHS however, changes to give:
 v0  (0) r	 
0B@ v0  (0)m  (0)Ey ["j " < 0]
+ 12
 
v00  (0)m  (0) + v
0
  (0)m
0
  (0)

Ey

"2
 " < 0
1CA (1  p)
+
0B@ v0+ (0)m+ (0)Ey ["j " > 0]
+ 12
 
v00+ (0)m+ (0) + v
0
+ (0)m
0
+ (0)

Ey

"2
 " > 0
1CA p (43)
Using Ey ["j " < 0] (1  p) =  Ey ["j " > 0] p and  = v
0
"(0)
v0#(0)
as before:
r	   
0B@

m  (0)Ey ["j " < 0] + 12

v00 (0)m (0)
v0(0) +m
0
  (0)

Ey

"2
 " < 0 (1  p)
+

m+ (0)Ey ["j " > 0] + 12

v00+(0)m+(0)
v0(0) +m
0
+ (0)

Ey

"2
 " > 0 1p
1CA
r	 

m  (0)  1

m+ (0)

Ey ["j " > 0] p
 1
2
0B@ (1  p)

v00 (0)m (0)
v0(0) +m
0
  (0)

Ey

"2
 " < 0
+ 1p

v00+(0)m+(0)
v0(0) +m
0
+ (0)

Ey

"2
 " > 0
1CA (44)
This leads as before to the su¢ cient conditions for risk aversion in CPT. These are given in
the proposition below.
Proposition 8 Given a monotonically increasing utility function
v(") =
8><>: v+("), if " > 0v ("), if " < 0
v(0) = 0
and a non-linear decision weighting function ("), applied separately to gains and losses
m (") =
8><>: m+ (") = w
0
+ (1  F (")) for all "  0
m  (x) = w0  (F (")) for all " < 0
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where w+ and w  are two strictly increasing weighting functions [0; 1]R! [0; 1] with w+ (0) =
w  (0) = 0 and w+ (1) = w  (1) = 1 and F (") is cumulative probability distribution of ", and
where any continuous prospect is evaluated using continuous cumulative prospect theory with the
reference point y. If we face a gamble with outcomes distributed according a random variable "
representing deviations from the reference point y. The gamble has zero mean, Ey [	"] = E (") =
0 and innitessimal variance, and
e)
 >
m+ (0)
m  (0)
(45)
f)
v00  (0) <  
m0  (0)
m  (0)
v0 (0) (46)
g)
v00+ (0) <  
m0+ (0)
m+ (0)
v0 (0) (47)
then the risk premium is positive, r	 > 0 (i.e., the individual is locally risk-averse for small
changes in wealth)
As before these conditions can be seen as a condition on loss aversion, and a pair of conditions,
analogous to the Pratt-Arrow curvature condition, on the curvature of the basic utility functions
for gains and for losses. All of these conditions are changed by the introduction of rank-dependent
probability weightings, and are related to the shape of the multiplier function, evaluated at the
reference point. As would be expected, the conditions e), f) and g) collapse to those given in
propositions 1 and 2 if the multiplier is everywhere equal to 1. Thus, without any non-linear
probability weightings, the su¢ cient conditions for a positive risk premium (and thus, overall
risk aversion) are that there is loss aversion ( > 1), and that the utility functions on basic
utility are everywhere concave. With the introduction of the decision weighting function these
conditions need to be adjusted to the forms given in the proposition above.
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Subjective Risk Premium The conditions given above ensure a positive objective risk pre-
mium where the risk aversion means the decision maker would rather take the objective expected
value, than take the gamble. However, since the decision maker will only ever be aware of their
subjective assessment of the probabilities in the gamble, it makes sense to also ask whether the
decision maker would rather take the subjective expected value, Esy [	], rather than the gamble
itself. A subjectively risk averse person would rather take her assessment of the expected value
than the gamble itself (and r	S > 0). This person may, however, be simultaneously risk seeking
in the objective sense (r	 < 0).
As we show below, ensuring subjective risk aversion requires an additional condition to those
which ensure objective risk aversion. In this case the subjective risk premium, r	S , is dened as:
v
 
Esy [	"]  r	S

= (1  p)Ey [v  (")m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [v+(")m+ (") j" > 0 ]
In this case the approximation of the RHS remains exactly as above, but for the LHS we can no
longer assume that Esy [	"] = 0 as this expectation may be distorted by subjective probability
assessments. Thus we have as the LHS of (43):
LHS = v
 
Esy [	"]  r	S

 v0  (0)
 
Esy [	"]  r	S

Using the same simplications as before this leads to a subjective analogue to (44):
r	S  Esy [	"] +

m  (0)  1

m+ (0)

Ey ["j " > 0] p
 1
2
0B@ (1  p)

v00 (0)m (0)
v0(0) +m
0
  (0)

Ey

"2
 " < 0
+ p

v00+(0)m+(0)
v0(0) +m
0
+ (0)

Ey

"2
 " > 0
1CA (48)
Apart from the rst term on the right hand side, this has exactly the same form as (44). In
order to guarantee subjective risk aversion for small prospects centred on the status quo, then,
the addition condition required is that Esy [	"] > 0 (or equivalently E
s
y [	"] > Ey [	"]).Looked at
another way this means that it is possible for decision makers to display objective risk aversion
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and have r	 < 0, and yet believe themselves to be risk neutral (or risk seeking) as r	S = 0 (> 0).
The opposite conclusion may also be true if Esy [	"] < Ey [	"]: the decision maker may appear
objectively risk seeking, but believe herself to be risk neutral or risk averse.
This relates to the subjectivity premium, r	 , introduced in (14):
r	 = r
	   r	S = Ey [	]  Esy [	] =
Z
xf (x) dx 
Z
xm (x) f (x) dx
The di¤erence between the objective risk premium and the subjective risk premium depends
only on the distortion of the expected value of the gamble that is induced by the probability
distortions. For a small prospect centred on the reference point we have Ey [	"] = 0 and
Esy [	"] = (1  p)Ey [m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [m+ (") j" > 0 ]. Thus
r	 =  Esy [	] =   ((1  p)Ey [m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [m+ (") j" > 0 ]) (49)
2.3 Discussion of Conditions of Risk Aversion at the Reference Point
The conditions on loss aversion with subjective probability weightings may be further investigated
by examining the conditions (45), (46) and (47) at the reference point, given what we know about
the shape of decision weighting functions. If we take Prelecs (1998) one parameter form for the
decision weighting function
w+ (P ) = w  (P ) = e (  lnP )
'
(50)
then the multiplier functions at zero are given by
m+(0) =
'
(1  F (0)) (  ln (1  F (0)))
' 1
e (  ln(1 F (0)))
'
m (0) =
'
F (0)
(  lnF (0))' 1 e (  lnF (0))'
where F (0) is the value of the cumulative probability distribution at the reference point.
Since the value of the cumulative distribution at x = 0 (F (0)) is equal to 1  p, these can be
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simplied to
m+(0) =
'
p
(  ln (p))' 1 e (  ln p)' (51)
m (0) =
'
1  p (  ln (1  p))
' 1
e (  ln(1 p))
'
(52)
Figure 3 shows m+(0) as a function of p for an inverse-S shaped Prelec decision weighting
function, using the empirical estimate of Wu and Gonzalez (1996) of ' = 0:74. The equivalent
function for m (0) is obtained by reecting this function around p = 0:5.
Insert Figure 3
2.3.1 Loss Aversion Condition
The ratio m+(0)m (0) in the loss aversion condition is equal to
m+ (0)
m  (0)
=
(1  p) (  ln p)' 1 e (  ln p)'
p (  ln (1  p))' 1 e (  ln(1 p))'
=
1  p
p

ln p
ln (1  p)
' 1
e ((  ln(1 p))
'+(  ln p)')
Loss aversion needs to be greater than this value to guarantee overall risk aversion. Using Prelecs
function then, the condition on loss aversion is dependent only on the degree of non-linearity in
the decision weighting ('), and the probability of getting a gain rather than a loss. Figure 4
below shows the dependency of the Loss Aversion su¢ ciency condition for the inverse-S shaped
Prelec decision weighting function (' = 0:74).
Insert Figure 4
At p = 50% the Loss Aversion parameter must be greater than 1 to guarantee a positive risk
premium (in conjunction with the curvature conditions). As the probability of a gain increases
from 50%, the degree of loss aversion required to guarantee a positive risk premium increases to
about  = 1:3, before dropping dramatically as the probability of a gain approaches unity. For
p < 50% the condition may be satised even for loss loving individuals, except for distributions
that approach loss-only distributions (i.e., with p = 0).
It is important to bear in mind that the distribution retains an expected value of zero,
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regardless of the probability of a gain in this analysis. Therefore by varying p, we are implicitly
skewing the distribution, although the variance remains negligibly small. By varying p then, we
are getting an idea of how the degree of local risk aversion (as measured by the risk premium)
in the immediate vicinity of the reference point is a¤ected by changing the proportions of gains
vs. loss of the distribution whilst maintaining a constant mean.
The relationship away from the endpoints can be more clearly seen if we restrict the range
of the graphic away from the extremes at p = 0 and p = 1, where the requirement diverge to
positive and negative innity respectively (Figure 5).
Insert Figure 5
2.3.2 Concavity Conditions
The other two conditions may be similarly examined. Figure 6 shows the relationship between
the ratio  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
and the value of p.
Insert Figure 6
The equivalent relationship between  m
0
+(0)
m+(0)
and p looks very similar as it is the negative of
the reection of Figure 6 about the point p = 0:5. Again, these relationships are clearer if we
dont graph the function as p approaches the extreme values of zero and one. This is shown for
the ratio taken as the function approaches the reference point from the left hand side

 m
0
 (0)
m (0)

in Figure 7 (i.e., a restricted view of Figure 6), and from the right hand side

 m
0
+(0)
m+(0)

in Figure
8 below.
Insert Figures 7 and 8
The concavity conditions required to ensure risk aversion are that the curvature of the loss
utility function at the reference point must be less than the above functions multiplied by v0 (0).
This amounts to a simple condition of concavity for both gains and losses if  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
and  m
0
+(0)
m+(0)
are both equal to zero. However, as can be seen from the Figures above, the functions are not
simultaneously equal to zero for any value of p. Thus at least one of the two concavity conditions
will be complicated by the addition of non-linear probability weightings.
To illustrate the e¤ect of decision weights on the concavity condition for risk aversion in this
context, consider the case when p = 0:5. Here we have  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
> 0 and  m
0
+(0)
m+(0)
< 0. Since
v0 (0) is greater than zero, this implies that the concavity condition on the gains utility function
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is strengthened: v00+ (0) <  m
0
+(0)
m+(0)
v0  (0) < 0 so the utility function must be su¢ ciently concave.
The condition on the loss utility function is weakened however, as the condition is given by
v00  (0) <  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
v0  (0), which is greater than zero. Thus, it is possible to guarantee a positive
risk premium whilst having a loss utility function that is locally convex at the reference point, as
long as it is not too convex. If the loss aversion condition is also met (which at p = 0:5 requires
that  > 1) then it is possible to have a positive risk premium whilst retaining the conditions
that have been empirically observed, to wit, loss aversion, concavity for gains, and convexity for
losses, with a utility function for losses that is more linear than that for gains.
In fact, this pattern can be accommodated for any value of p below that where  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
= 0,
or for extremely low values of p where loss aversion exceeds the commonly observed value of
about  = 2:25 (which only occurs below p  0:00001 for ' = 0:74).  m
0
 (0)
m (0)
= 0 occurs at
p = 1=e  0:63 regardless of the value of ' (see Prelec 2000), so a positive risk premium can
still be guaranteed with a convex utility function for losses as long as the probability of a gain
is not too high, thus implying too long a tail for losses to ensure a zero expected value. If the
probability of a gain is greater than 1=e then a positive risk premium can only be guaranteed
with a concave utility function for losses.
2.4 Risk Aversion with Non-linear Probability Weights Away from the
Reference Point
The above analysis of risk aversion conditions with non-linear probability weightings has assumed
throughout that we are examining prospects with small variance with the mean centered on
the reference point. Often, if not usually, however, decision makers will be choosing between
prospects that have positive or negative mean values. We now examine small variance prospects
with non-zero means. In this case we will not have to employ both losses and gains in the
solutions as the entire distribution is contained within an arbitrarily small range around the
mean value Ey ["]. The (objective) risk premium is dened here as:
v
 
Ey ["]  r	

= Ey [m (") v (")] (53)
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where m (") is either m+ (") or m  (") as appropriate. Employing the now familiar approxima-
tions around the point Ey ["] yields
LHS  v (Ey ["])  r	v0 (Ey ["])
and
RHS  Ey
266664
v (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + ("  Ey ["]) (v0 (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + v (Ey ["])m0 (Ey ["]))
+ 12 ("  Ey ["])2
0B@ v00 (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + 2v0 (Ey ["])m0 (Ey ["])
+v (Ey ["])m
00 (Ey ["])
1CA
377775
 v (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + 1
2
2
0B@ v00 (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + 2v0 (Ey ["])m0 (Ey ["])
+v (Ey ["])m
00 (Ey ["])
1CA (54)
Setting these approximately equal to each other gives
v (Ey ["])  r	v0 (Ey ["])  v (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + 1
2
2
0B@ v00 (Ey ["])m (Ey ["]) + 2v0 (Ey ["])m0 (Ey ["])
+v (Ey ["])m
00 (Ey ["])
1CA
r	  v (Ey ["])
v0 (Ey ["])

1 m (Ey ["])  
2
2
m00 (Ey ["])

(55)
 2m0 (Ey ["])  
2
2
v00 (Ey ["])
v0 (Ey ["])
m (Ey ["])
The last term in this approximate solution is almost identical to the Pratt-Arrow risk pre-
mium, with the exception that it is multiplied by m (E ["]). Since this function is always positive,
the sign of this term is determined solely by the curvature of the utility function at E ["]. From
Figure 3 we see that m (E ["]) < 1 (for an inverse-S shaped weighting function) unless the prob-
ability mass above and below the mean is highly asymmetrical. In these cases where F (E ["])
is far from 0.5, m (E ["]) increases rapidly. For all distributions without extreme skew then,
nonlinear probability weighting will dampen risk attitude expressed by this term towards risk
neutrality.
The rst term is the same sign as v (E ["]) ifm (E ["])+ 
2
2 m
00 (E ["]) < 1. From the paragraph
above we know the behaviour ofm (E ["]). Again examining Figure 3 we see that, for an inverse-S
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shaped weighting function we that m00 (E ["]) > 0 (i.e., it is everywhere convex) and relatively
linear (m00 (E ["]) close to 0) as long as the distribution is not highly asymmetrical. Thus, for small
variance distributions without extreme asymmetry, this term would increase risk aversion for
gains, and decrease it for losses. This situation would reverse for highly asymmetric distributions
(for which m (E ["]) + 
2
2 m
00 (E ["]) > 1.
The middle term,  2m0 (E ["]), is negative if m0 (E ["]) > 0, which occurs as the distribution
becomes more negatively asymmetric for losses (that is as the probability mass below the mean,
F (E ["]), increases) and more positively asymmetric for gains (F (1  E ["]) increases). For
distributions without extreme symmetry m0 (E ["]) is fairly close to zero and should not have a
major impact on the risk premium.
The standard Pratt-Arrow risk premium r	   22 v
00(E["])
v0(E["]) is a special case of equation (55)
with no nonlinear probability transformations: m (E ["]) = 1.
3 Decision Making Example Employing Exact Solutions
To complete this paper we provide an example of an exact solution for the risk premium using a
particular distribution of outcomes, and show how this premium is inuenced by the behavioural
components of risk aversion, loss aversion, and decision weights. We choose for our distribution
of outcomes a nancial example, using excess returns for the US stock market over a twenty year
period. This example is used primarily for the convenience and availability of long periods of
nancial data, but is intended to be purely illustrative.
Davies and Satchell (2003) show that the continuous CPT evaluation is explicitly solvable if
one uses two power utility functions for gain and losses, a split Weibull distribution for returns
(KST distribution (Knight, Satchell et al. 1995)), and Prelecs functional form for the probability
weighting function (Prelec 1998). Köbberling and Wakker (2003) note that their loss aversion
index  =
v0"(0)
v0#(0)
poses problems for the use of power utility functions. Following their discussion
we employ exponential utility in our example.
Utility is thus given by:
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v+ (x) =
1  e gx
g
for x  0 (56)
v  (x) =
elx   1
l
for x < 0 (57)
where g and l govern the curvature of the utility functions for gains and losses respectively and,
where both are greater than zero we have the most common empirical situation of concavity for
gains and convexity for losses.
The density function by:
f (x) =
8><>: p
1

1
1
(x)
1 1 e 

x
1
1
for x > 0
(1  p) 2

2
2
( x)2 1 e 

 x
2
2
for x  0
(58)
where 1 and 1 are parameters of the positive Weibull distribution, and 2 and 2 are the
Weibull parameters for losses. p is the probability of being above the reference point. When
tted to the monthly excess returns of the S&P 500 from October 1982 to September 2002
(using 3 month treasury bills as the risk free asset) using maximum likelihood estimation, the
parameters are 1 = 1:268, 1 = 0:037, 2 = 1:087, and 2 = 0:037. p is equal to 60:83%. The
mean excess return is Ey [	] = 0:671% per month (approx. 8.1% per year).
The cumulative distribution is given by:
F (x) =
8>><>>:
(1  p) + p

1  e 

x
1
1
for x > 0
(1  p)

 e 

 x
2
2 (59)
Prelecs weighting function gives:
m+(x) =
'
(1  F (x)) (  ln (1  F (x)))
' 1
e (  ln(1 F (x)))
'
(60)
m (x) =
'
F (x)
(  lnF (x))' 1 e (  lnF (x))' (61)
with 1 F (x) as the decumulative distribution for gains, and F (x)the cumulative distribution
for losses.
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Let us also dene for notational convenience:
u+  pEy [v+(x)m+(x)f (x) jx > 0 ] (62)
u   (1  p)Ey [v  (x)m  (x) f (x) jx < 0 ] (63)
Using this notation Vy [	] becomes:
Vy [	] =
Z 0
 1
v  (x)m  (x) f (x) dx+
Z 1
0
v+ (x)m+(x)f (x) dx
= (1  p)Ey [v  (x)m  (x) f (x) jx < 0 ] + pEy [v+(x)m+(x)f (x) jx > 0 ]
= u+ + u  (64)
These functional forms lead to the following equations which can be computed numerically
(see Appendix for derivation):
u+ =
1
g
1Z
(  ln q)'
e y
0@1  e g1y 1'+ln q 11
1A dy
u  =
1
l
1Z
(  ln(1 q))'
e z
0@e l2z 1'+ln(1 q) 12   1
1A dz
Thus, for Ey [	]  r	 > 0:
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1+ (Vy [	])
= Ey [	] +
ln (1  Vy [	])

= Ey [	] +
ln (1   (u+ + u ))

(65)
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And for Ey [	]  r	 < 0:
r	 = Ey [	]  v 1 

Vy [	]


= Ey [	] 
ln

1 + 

u++u 



(66)
In what follows we explore these expressions and their sensitivity to the various parameters.
Since Ey [	] = 0:671%, solutions with r	 < 0:671% are taken from the rst of these expressions
(where the certain amount is evaluated as a gain), and solutions with r	 > 0:671% will employ
the second expression (66). Current theory and empirical data suggest that decision makers
display concave basic utility for gains (g > 0), convex basic utility for losses (l > 0), loss aversion
( > 1), and inverse-S shaped decision weighting functions (0 < ' < 1). Specic estimates for
the latter two suggest that values of  between 2 and 2:5 are appropriate (we shall employ 2:25
as our default) and ' ' 0:74 (Wu and Gonzalez 1996).
Using the default values for  and ', Figure 9 shows the risk premium for concave gains
and convex losses. For this distribution and a range for both g and l between 0 and 5, the
risk premium ranges between about 1:2% and 1:8%: As expected it is increasing in the degree
of concavity for gains, and deceasing in the amount of convexity for losses. These values are
substantially higher than the expected excess returns of Ey [	] = 0:671% - an investor with a
risk premium in the indicated range would require a risk premium greater than the expected
excess returns and would thus not purchase the index.
Insert Figure 9
Figure 10 illustrates the case where the decision maker displays convexity of basic utility for
both gains and losses (g < 0, l > 0). Unlike the situation with standard risk premia in EUT,
these conditions do not automatically imply risk seeking behaviour for this returns distribution.
In fact, the convexity has to be quite strong in both cases for risk seeking behaviour to result.
This is because both loss aversion and non-linear decision weighting (with an inverse-S function)
increase risk aversion. The kink in the surface occurs at r	 = 0:671% and shows the e¤ect of
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shifting from equation (66) to (65). For 0 < r	 < 0:671% the risk premium is determined by
(65) but is still positive, reecting overall risk aversion.
Insert Figure 10
Figure 11 demonstrates the e¤ects of Loss Aversion, and non-linear decision weights on the
risk premium after setting g = l = 1. We see that r	 is indeed increasing as loss aversion
increases, and that it is decreasing in '. No probability transformation is shown by the line at
' = 1, with an inverse-S shaped weighting curve (as it most commonly observed) for ' < 1, and
an S-shaped curve for ' > 1: Strong nonlinear decision weights can have a large e¤ect on the
risk premium.
Insert Figure 11
Lastly, Figure 12 examines the di¤erence between the objective risk premium r	 and the
subjective risk premium r	S . The di¤erence between them is equal to the di¤erence between the
expected value of the distribution Ey [	] and the subjective expected value Esy [	] as given by
(14). We have (see Appendix for derivations):
Esy [	"] = (1  p)Ey [m  (") j" < 0 ] + pEy [m+ (") j" > 0 ]
= 1
1Z
(  ln q)'
e y

y
1
' + ln q
 1
1
dy   2
1Z
(  ln(1 q))'

z
1
' + ln (1  q)
 1
2
e zdz(67)
The subjectivity premium r	 = Ey [	] Esy [	] is subtracted from r	 to give the subjective
(Pratt-Arrow) risk premium r	S . This subjectivity premium is positive for ' < 1, zero for no
probability transformations (' = 0), and negative for S-shaped utility curves (' > 1). Thus for
US equity returns, non-linear decision weights with in inverse-S shaped weighting function causes
the subjective risk premium to be less than the objective premium: r	S < r
	. In other words,
individuals who distort probability in this way will believe themselves to be less risk averse than
they actually are. However, we can also see from the chart that it is possible for the two risk
premia to have di¤erent signs. For values of ' in the region of approximately 1.1 to 1.4, the
decision makers believe themselves to be risk averse, whereas from an objective point of view the
are actually behaving as risk seekers. These results show the considerable e¤ect that this new
concept of the subjectivity premium can have on risk attitudes.
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Insert Figure 12
4 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have shown that the standard characterisation of risk attitude as being driven
by the curvature of the utility function glosses many nuances of the potential behavioural origins
of risk aversion. When we set aside Expected Utility Theory in favour of a more behaviourally
sophisticated model of decision making, such as the reference and rank dependent models as
exemplied by CPT, we see that risk attitude may arise in complex ways from the interaction
of a number of distinct psychological or psychophysical reactions. In particular, whilst utility
curvature still plays an important role in risk attitude, it now becomes important to distinguish
between the gain and loss domains when considering the e¤ect of curvature. The most common
empirical result of concave reactions to gains and convex reactions to losses (which may be theo-
retically defended by an appeal to diminishing sensitivity away from the reference point) means
that curvature for gains and for losses have quite distinct, and opposite, roles in determining
overall risk aversion. In addition, risk attitude is a¤ected by two other behavioural components:
the tendency to treat losses with greater consideration than gains, and the tendency to dis-
tort probabilities in a rank-dependent fashion. Both of these concepts have e¤ects on the risk
premium that may be entirely separated from the traditional e¤ects of utility curvature.
Our paper has provided both general and approximate local solutions for the risk premium
that show the e¤ects of each of the behavioural components individually. In addition we have
provided the conditions on the behavioural components that are required to ensure local risk
aversion. These conditions are the behavioural analogues of the traditional Pratt-Arrow condi-
tion of concave utility. The more sophisticated behavioural models allow us to decompose risk
measurement into more meaningful e¤ects than has hitherto been possible and also to be more
precise in our language and analysis of what the e¤ects of a given change in behaviour will be.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of Exact Solutions
Where excess returns are distributed according to
f (x) =
8><>: pf
+ (x) for x  0
(1  p) f  ( x) for x < 0
(68)
for which the cumulative distribution is
F (x) =
8><>: (1  p) (1  F
  ( x)) if x < 0
(1  p) + pF+ (x) if x  0
(69)
And the outcomes are distributed according to a Weibull distribution we have:
f+ (x;1; 1) =
1
11
x1 1e
 
 
x
1
!1
, 0 < x <1 (70)
F+ (x;1; 1) = 1  e
 
 
x
1
!1
, 0 < x <1 (71)
5.1.1 Gains
The imputed gains distribution + (x) is arrived at by multiplying the objective distribution
f+ (x;1; 1) by the multiplierm
+ (x) = w0+ (p (1  F+ (x))) which, when using Prelecs weight-
ing function is
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m+ (x) =
'
p (1  F+ (x))
   ln p  1  F+ (x)' 1 e (  ln p(1 F+(x)))'
=
'
pe
 
 
x
1
!1
0B@  ln pe 
 
x
1
!11CA
' 1
e
 
0BBB@  ln pe
 
0B@ x
1
1CA
11CCCA
'
=
'
p
e
 
x
1
!1 
x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
=
'
p

x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
x
1
!1
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
(72)
Therefore the imputed distribution is:
+ (x) = m+ (x) pf+ (x;1; 1) (73)
=
'
p

x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
x
1
!1
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
p1
11
x1 1e
 
 
x
1
!1
=
'1
11
x1 1

x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
(74)
5.1.2 Losses
For losses the objective pdf is:
f  ( x;2; 2) =
2
22
( x)2 1 e
 
  x
2
!2
,  1 < x < 0 (75)
and the associated cdf is:
F  ( x;2; 2) = 1  e
 
  x
2
!2
; 1 < x < 0 (76)
The multiplier function is:
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m  (x) = w0 
 
(1  p)  1  F  ( x)
=
'
((1  p) (1  F  ( x)))
   ln (1  p)  1  F  ( x)' 1 e (  ln(1 p)(1 F ( x)))'
=
'0B@(1  p) e 
  x
2
!21CA
0B@  ln (1  p) e 
  x
2
!21CA
' 1
e
 
0BBB@  ln(1 p)e
 
0B@ x
2
1CA
21CCCA
'
=
'
(1  p)
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
  x
2
!2
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
(77)
Combining these as before to form the imputed distribution   (x):
  (x) = m  (x) (1  p) f  ( x;2; 2)
=
'
(1  p)
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
  x
2
!2
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
(1  p)2
22
( x)2 1 e
 
  x
2
!2
=
'2
22
( x)2 1
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
(78)
5.2 Derivation of u+ for Mixed Functions
u+ is
u+ = pEB (v+ (x) jx > 0)
=
1Z
0
v+ (x)m
+ (x) pf+ (x) dx
=
1Z
0
v+ (x)
+ (x) dx (79)
where EB is the subjective expected value including probability weights, loss aversion, and utility
curvature.
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Combining the Weibull-KST distribution and the multiplication function to form u+:
u+ =
1Z
0
1  e gx
g
+ (x) dx
=
1Z
0
1  e gx
g
'1
11
x1 1

x
1
1
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' 1
e
 
  
x
1
!1
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dx
=
'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g11
1Z
0
 
1  e gxx1 1 x
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1
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e
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!1
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dx (80)
Let y =

x
1
1
  ln p
'
,
then x = 1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
and dx =
1
'1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
 1
y
1
' 1dy
Substituting,
u+ =
'1
g11
1Z
(  ln p)'
0@1  e g1y 1'+ln p 11
1A1 y 1' + ln p 111 1 y1  1' e y 1'1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
 1
y
1
' 1dy
=
1
g
1Z
(  ln p)'
e y
0@1  e g1y 1'+ln p 11
1A dy (81)
5.3 Derivation of u  for Mixed Functions
To solve over the loss domain,
u  =
0Z
 1
v  (x) (1  p) f  ( x)m  (x) dx
=
0Z
 1
elx   1
l
  (x) dx
=
'2
l22
0Z
 1
 
elx   1 ( x)2 1 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
dx
Let z =
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
'
,
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then x =  2

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
and dx =   2
'2

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
 1
z
1
' 1dz
The value of u  follows as before:
u  =   '2
l22
(  ln(1 p))'Z
1
0@e l2z 1'+ln(1 p) 12   1
1A
0B@ z 1'
+ ln (1  p)
1CA
2 1
2
e z
22
'2
0B@ z 1'
+ ln (1  p)
1CA
1
2
 1
dz
=  1
l
(  ln(1 p))'Z
1
e z
0@e l2z 1'+ln(1 p) 12   1
1A dz
=
1
l
1Z
(  ln(1 p))'
e z
0@e l2z 1'+ln(1 p) 12   1
1A dz (82)
5.4 Subjective Expected Value
pEy [m+ (") j" > 0 ] =
1Z
0
xf+ (x) pm+ (x) dx
=
1Z
0
x+ (x) dx
=
1Z
0
'1
11
x1

x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
dx
=
'1
11
1Z
0
x1

x
1
1
  ln p
' 1
e
 
  
x
1
!1
 ln p
!'
dx (83)
Let y =

x
1
1
  ln p
'
,
then x = 1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
and dx =
1
'1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
 1
y
1
' 1dy
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Substituting,
pEy [m+ (") j" > 0 ] = '1
11
1Z
(  ln p)'

1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
1
y1 
1
' e y
1
'1

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
 1
y
1
' 1dy
= 1
1Z
(  ln p)'
e y

y
1
' + ln p
 1
1
dy (84)
Similarly, for losses:
(1  p)Ey [m  (") j" < 0 ] =
Z 0
 1
'2
22
( x)2 1 x
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
dx
=  '2
22
Z 0
 1
( x)2
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
' 1
e
 
   x
2
!2
 ln(1 p)
!'
dx
Let z =
 x
2
2
  ln (1  p)
'
,
then  x = 2

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
and dx =   2
'2

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
 1
z
1
' 1dz
(1  p)Ey [m  (") j" < 0 ] = '2
22
(  ln(1 p))'Z
1

z
1
' + ln (1  p)

e z
2+12
'2

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
 1
dz
= 2
(  ln(1 p))'Z
1
e z

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
dz
=  2
1Z
(  ln(1 p))'

z
1
' + ln (1  p)
 1
2
e zdz (85)
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Notes
1This condition is implied by symmetry about 0, but does not imply it.
2We have made some changes to their notation to t with that of the present article.
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premium
1:pdf
Figure 1: Arrows risk premium without probability distortion, p, and with probability distortion,
p0, plotted against  v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 using Tversky and Kahnemans weighting function with  = 0:69,
and  = 0:61. If p0 > p for a given value of  v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 indicates that probability distortion causes
the decision maker to be more risk averse.
premium2
2:pdf
Figure 2: Arrows risk premium without probability distortion, p, and with probability distortion,
p0, plotted against  v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 using Tversky and Kahnemans weighting function with  = 0:61,
and  = 0:69. If p0 > p for a given value of  v
00(0)
v0(0)
h
2 indicates that probability distortion causes
the decision maker to be more risk averse. In this case, the change in the parameters causes Levy
and Levys conclusion that probability distortion always increases risk aversion to no longer be
valid.
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Function
3:pdf
Figure 3: Gains Multiplier Function at reference point, m+ (0)
condition
4:pdf
Figure 4: Loss Aversion su¢ ciency condition for positive risk premium as a function of the
probability of a gain (p) with the inverse-S shaped decision weighting function (' = 0:74)
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condition internal
5:pdf
Figure 5: Loss Aversion su¢ ciency condition for positive risk premium as a function of the
probability of a gain (p) with the inverse-S shaped decision weighting function (' = 0:74).
Restricted range.
Curvature Condition
6:pdf
Figure 6: The negative of the relative slope of the muliplier function at the reference point
approached from the negative side

 m
0
 (0)
m (0)

versus the probability of a gain, p.
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Curvature Int Condition
7:pdf
Figure 7: The negative of the relative slope of the muliplier function at the reference point
approached from the negative side

 m
0
 (0)
m (0)

versus the probability of a gain, p. Restricted
range.
Curvature Int Condition
8:pdf
Figure 8: The negative of the relative slope of the muliplier function at the reference point
approached from the postive side

 m
0
+(0)
m+(0)

versus the probability of a gain, p.
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Figure 9: Objective risk premium, r	, for concave gains utility (0 < g < 5) and convex loss
utility (0 < l < 5), with Prelecs inverse-S shaped probability weighting curve (' = 0:74), and
loss aversion  = 2:25:
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Figure 10: Objective risk premium, r	, for convex gains utility ( 10 < g < 0) and convex loss
utility (0 < l < 10), with Prelecs inverse-S shaped probability weighting curve (' = 0:74), and
loss aversion  = 2:25. Kink in function occurs at r	 = 0:00671.
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lam and
pre
11:pdf
Figure 11: Objective risk premium, r	, for combinations of loss aversion () and Prelecs prob-
ability weighting curve ('). Gains utility is concave (g = 1) and loss utility convex (l = 1).
Prelecs function is inverse-S shaped for ' < 1, S shaped for ' > 1 with no distortion at ' = 1
Kink in function occurs at r	 = 0:00671.
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Figure 12: Objective and subjective risk premia for di¤ering degrees of probability distortion
(0:5 < ' < 1:5). g = l = 1 and  = 2:25. The Subjectivity premium r	 = r
	   r	S is equal to
the di¤erence between the objective and subjective expected excess returns Ey [	]  ESy [	].
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